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Power, hegemony, and social reality in Gramsci and Searle
Matthew Rachar*
Department of Philosophy, Graduate Center, CUNY, New York, NY, USA
This paper reconstructs Gramsci’s account of social objects in light of recent
developments in analytic social ontology. It combines elements of Gramsci’s
account with that of John Searle, and argues that when taken together their the-
ories constitute a robust account of social reality and a nuanced view of the
relation between social reality and power. Searle provides a detailed analysis of
the creation of social entities at the level of the agent, while Gramsci, by
employing his concepts of hegemony and domination, is able to provide an
analysis of the differential ability of societal subgroups to construct the social
world.
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1. Introduction
Antonio Gramsci develops a detailed theory of social reality based on the intuition
that not all objects have their properties because of their material composition.
Despite emerging from a divergent tradition, Gramsci shares this motivating intu-
ition about the nature of social entities with several modern theorists of social
ontology. The central task of this paper is to reconstruct Gramsci’s account with
the modern debate in mind, and develop the novel suggestions contained therein. I
make two specific claims. First, working within the Marxist tradition leads Gramsci
to give a superior account of the role of power in the origination and nature of
social reality. More specifically, his account of hegemony and civil society provides
us with a framework to analyze the difference between specific powers that are cre-
ated by social reality and the wider sense of power on which social reality depends,
as well as the differential power of certain groups to create social reality. Second,
these insights may be combined with the concepts and distinctions developed in
recent analytic social ontology in order to develop a powerful social theory.
I begin by sketching the concerns and questions addressed by philosophers such
as John Searle, Raimo Tuomela, Frank Hindriks, and Amie Thomasson, and then
considering the specific account of social entities given by John Searle. In order to
argue for the claims made above, I first place Gramsci’s work within the Marxist
tradition to show why he holds that a full account of social objects is necessary. I
then detail Gramsci’s account of social reality and trace the connections between
this account and his concepts of hegemony, political power, and civil society.
Finally, I consider the extent to which Gramsci’s account provides a satisfactory
answer to the questions raised in the first section, and compare his account to that
of Searle. I argue that Gramsci’s focus on the political and historical nature of
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social objects leads him to develop two important aspects of an analysis of social
reality. First, he claims that we need to give an ‘ideological critique’ of the belief
systems that inform our collective acceptance of social objects, and second, that we
need to adopt the ‘genealogical perspective’ toward particular social objects in
order to understand their function and place in society. However, because Gramsci’s
account takes place at the societal level, it is underspecified with regard to the con-
struction of social entities by particular agents. It is therefore only when these two
ideas are combined with the analysis of Searle that we get a comprehensive picture
of the creation of social reality that also allows for the proper recognition of the
dependence of social objects on social and political power.
2. Social ontology: three questions
As the first claim of this paper is that Gramsci provides an account of social reality
in line with the modern debate, the first task is to clarify the nature of that debate.
In its current form, there are three central questions that motivate the study of
social ontology in the analytic tradition. These questions provide the metric by
which we can evaluate the theories of Gramsci and Searle.1 The first is metaphysi-
cal: how can human intentionality create ‘real’ facts and objects? The existence of
objects like money, banks, laws, and corporations, and facts like ‘Canada is a par-
liamentary democracy’ seem to challenge the common sense notion that believing
something to be the case cannot make it so, as they depend on the intentional states
of individuals for whatever ‘reality’ they have. Social entities are the products of
human agreement or acceptance which in turn rely upon human beliefs and inten-
tions. In this way then, they differ from natural objects, which exist independently
of any process of human intentionality. This difference causes many to question the
genuineness of such entities. Searle states this concern nicely by pointing out that
in the creation of social entities we have a sense that ‘there is an element of magic,
a conjuring trick, a sleight of hand’ and that:
In our toughest metaphysical moods we want to ask … are these bits of paper really
money? Is this piece of land really somebody’s private property? … Surely when you
get down to brass tacks, these are not real facts. (1995, p. 45)
Any adequate theory of social ontology must provide a palliative for this kind of
concern, a story which explains how social entities may both be the product of
human intentionality and parts of objective reality without being completely reduci-
ble to their material composition.
The second question is epistemological: if social entities depend on collective
acceptance and intentional states such as belief, how can we come to know new
things about them? It appears that in order for these things to exist, we need to
have some beliefs about them, and because their particular role is determined by
our beliefs and intentions, it is unclear how we could discover previously unknown
facts about them. Nonetheless, it is clear that the social sciences do exactly that.
This concern has two parts. First, many of the entities that depend upon some form
of acceptance still remain opaque in many ways, take, for example, predictions
about the behavior of the US Supreme Court. Second, many seemingly unintended,
and perhaps in some cases completely unknown, higher level social facts arise from
individual actions within accepted institutions. Patterns of police behavior,
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conviction rates, and sentencing disparities resulting from the actions of individuals
within the social institutions that depend on human intentionality may reveal that
the particular system contains racial bias without any form of collective acceptance
about that particular consequence. One important desideratum of a theory of social
ontology is that it is able to confront these questions, and provide some insight into
the logical structure of the objects studied by the social sciences, which in turn
allows for a more thorough examination of the methods and understanding of the
results of social scientific investigations.
The third question is also dependent on our answer to the first, and concerns
the role of power and coercion in social reality: if we are responsible for creating
the social world through our intentional actions, how is it that when we are faced
with social entities they appear to be independent of our will, and at times even
exhibit a strong power over us? This question has two subparts. The first concerns
our encounter with the social entities. Social facts have control over us because
they shape and guide our choices and actions. This may both take the form of
either a limiting of our horizon of possibilities or an enabling of new possibilities.
It is impossible to become president without independent social facts, just as it is
possible to restrict certain groups of people from participating in social institutions
such as marriage. There is, however, a second, much less discussed, sense in which
social entities have coercive power. The ability to create and institute social entities
is hierarchical. Not all subgroups in a society are equally endowed with the ability
to construct the social world in which they live. For these subgroups then, the
social objects they encounter will not only be coercive in the first sense, but also in
the sense that the functions ascribed to these objects will appear foreign, or worse,
counter to their interests. It is on this point that the account provided by Gramsci
far exceeds the account developed by Searle, and adds something vital to the
modern debate, an analysis of the relations of power involved in the construction
of the social world.
3. Searle’s account of social reality
One of the most prominent modern attempts to answer these questions has been
put forward by Searle (1995, 2010). According to Searle, the construction of social
reality depends upon one central operation, ‘Status Function Declarations’. Searle
states that ‘All of human institutional reality … is created in its initial existence
and maintained in its continued existence by a single, logico-linguistic operation …
a Status Function Declaration’ (2010, p. 201). A ‘status function declaration’ is an
act, although not necessary a speech act, that involves linguistic representations that
take the following form: ‘We make it the case by Declaration that the Y Status
Function exists in context C’ (2010, p. 99). The complexity of human institutional
reality is explainable in these simple terms because these rules can apply to any
subject matter and can be recursively applied such that the outcomes of earlier
applications are the inputs for new declarations. The combination of broad subject
matter and our ability to apply the operation repeatedly to layer status functions on
top of one another creates the intricate interlocking structures of institutional facts
familiar from actual human societies.
Some further discussion of these concepts is required to explicate this basic
idea. First, declarations denote a particular kind of speech act for Searle that makes
something the case simply by representing it as such. Searle states that declarations
Journal of Political Power 229
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [
T
he
 U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 o
f 
B
ri
tis
h 
C
ol
um
bi
a]
 a
t 0
1:
17
 2
5 
Ju
ne
 2
01
6 
‘change the world by declaring that a state of affairs exists and thus bringing that
state of affairs into existence’ (2010, p. 12). A standard example is the leader of a
meeting saying, ‘This meeting is adjourned’. We use this basic form of linguistic
representation to impose ‘status functions’ on entities. Status functions are distin-
guished from ‘agentive functions’ on the grounds that ‘status functions’ are func-
tions which cannot be performed solely on the basis of their physical
characteristics, but rather require collective acceptance and recognition of that func-
tion (2010, p. 59). Roughly, a hammer functions as a hammer for an agent because
of a certain set of physical features which allow it to serve the agent’s purpose,
while money could take a variety of forms and still function as money, but in any
of these forms it requires that other agents also take it as money.
The important point for us is that the creation of an institutional fact depends
on collective acceptance. Searle argues that for institutional facts to exist ‘there
must be collective acceptance or recognition’ of the standing declaration or the ad
hoc utterance (2010, p. 8). To avoid concerns that this type of acceptance implies
approval, endorsement, or explicit agreement in all cases, Searle suggests that there
is a range of attitudes that are sufficient by going on to say that ‘Acceptance …
goes all the way from enthusiastic endorsement to grudging acknowledgement’
(2010, p. 8). Thus, simply ‘going along with it’ designates the type of relation
necessary and sufficient for the creation of an institutional fact.
By accepting a status function we create a set of deontic powers, which are
powers expressible in terms of deontological notions such as obligations, rights,
entitlements, and so on. Searle adds this to the logical form of status function
declarations as follows:
We (or I) make it the case by declaration that a Y status function exists in C and in
so doing we (or I) create a relation R between Y and a certain person or persons S,
such that in virtue of SRY, S has the power to perform acts (of type) A. (2010,
pp. 101–102)
Putting this account together, status function declarations create a system of power
relations which exist only because we collectively represent them as existing. For
Searle, this is the fundamental idea of social ontology. Having the title to a house,
for example, gives the owner certain powers to sell it, inhabit it and perhaps rent it
out, depending on certain contextual factors. Further, other people accrue certain
restrictions on their power, thus they may in certain cases be charged with trespass-
ing if they enter the house uninvited.
Searle then offers a more comprehensive account of power. He claims that the
notion of power is that of a capacity or ability, specifically of an agent, A, to get a
subject, S, to do X regardless of whether S initially wants to do X or not. Searle
argues for two constraints on more detailed analyses of power. The first is based on
the idea that the exercise of power ‘is always an intentional act’ (2010, p. 148),
and that ‘the concept of power is logically tied to the concept of the intentional
exercise of power’ (2010, p. 151). This means that in order to analyze power rela-
tions we need to specify the intentional content of a specific exercise of power. He
calls this the ‘intentionality constraint’. He then claims that ‘any satisfactory discus-
sion of power … should be able to say, who exactly has power over exactly whom
to get them to do exactly what’ (2010, p. 152). He labels this the ‘exactness
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constraint’. According to Searle, analyses of power that do not meet these
constraints are not focused enough to be of value (2010, pp. 151–152).
Despite the limiting nature of these constraints, Searle wants to offer an account
of the claim that society can exercise power over its members, and that social pres-
sure can be a form of power. In order to do this, he introduces the idea of ‘back-
ground/network’ power, which is ‘not codified, is seldom explicit, and may even
be largely unconscious’ (2010, p. 155). It takes the form of social pressure that
dictates our everyday choices. The idea is that:
there is a set of Background presuppositions, attitudes, dispositions, capacities, and
practices of any community that set normative constraints on the members of that
community in such a way that violations of those constraints are subject to the nega-
tive imposition of sanctions by any member of the community. (2010, p. 160)
The upshot of this view is that even background power can be most reasonably
explained in terms of individual members exercising power by imposing sanctions
on other individuals for specific violations of implicit societal norms. Thus, Searle
claims, we can analyze this claim about societal power in terms that satisfy the
intentionality and exactness conditions.
Finally, Searle turns to political power. He holds that ‘All political power is a
matter of status functions, and for that reason all political power is deontic power’
(2010, p. 164). This may strike some as strange, because it seems that there is
something different about the power exercised by political bodies when compared
to the power exercised by social institutions. In order to respond to this, Searle pre-
sents a specific view of government. He argues that governments have two special
features: a monopoly on organized violence, and control of a territory. Conse-
quently, governments take a primary role in the competing system of status func-
tions and are the paradigm of public activity because they control the nature of
social institutions. It is therefore ‘the ultimate institutional structure’ (2010, p. 161).
We can see, however, that there is a tension in this view. Status functions rely on
collective acceptance, which suggests that political power ‘comes from below’
(2010, p. 165), while a monopoly on organized violence implies coercion based on
the threat of force. If the system of status functions associated with political power
‘can continue to function only if there is a permanent threat of violence in the form
of the military and the police’ (2010, p. 163), as Searle admits, it seems to under-
mine the claims of collective acceptance, and further to undermine the claim that
because political power relies on collective acceptance it ‘differs from military
power, police power, and the brute physical power that the strong have over the
weak’ (2010, p. 164). Searle recognizes this ‘paradox’, but does little to answer it
(2010, p. 163). We will return to these claims in order to evaluate them after the
presentation of Gramsci’s account.
4. Gramsci’s account of social reality2
4.1. Historical background
Gramsci develops an account of social objects that aims to solve many of these
same issues, and he does so in response to a current of Marxist thought that was
influential at the time. Because Gramsci’s starting position, theoretical interests, and
conceptual framework are foreign to the developers of the questions laid out in the
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first section and the account considered in the second section, we will need to
briefly situate Gramsci’s thought in order to show how he came to recognize these
questions as important and how the questions themselves confront similar phenom-
ena.
Aiming for a purely ‘scientific socialism’, many Marxists of the time removed
any trace of ‘subjective’ or ‘voluntaristic’ elements from consideration in a serious
theory of society. There are several examples of this line of thought in the 1920s,
such as Kautsky in Germany and Plekhanov in Russia (Femia, 1981, pp. 66–67,
Salamini, 1981, pp. 3–5). One theorist generally working within this tradition was
Nikolai Bukharin. Partially, because it was the book to which Gramsci had access,
Gramsci focuses his general critique of the ‘vulgar materialism’ of the orthodox
Marxism of his time on Bukharin’s Popular Manual.3
Under Bukharin’s account, all existence is strictly material, and all mental activ-
ities are reducible to their physiological bases. Human subjectivity is denied any
causal efficacy. As Bukharin states, ‘Society and its evolution are as much subject
to natural law as is everything else in the universe’ (1969, p. 46). The basic idea of
this view is that human behavior, social action, and ultimately the totality of soci-
ety, in other words the objects normally considered to be the domain of the social
sciences, can be studied and explained completely in the language of the physical
sciences.
Gramsci’s aim in attacking Bukharin was to restore a role for conscious, cre-
ative human activity in the study of society and in Marxist thought. He holds that
‘Man does not enter into relations with nature just by being himself part of nature,
but actively, by means of work and technique. Furthermore these relations are not
mechanical. They are active and conscious’ (cited Femia, 1981, p. 70). This consid-
eration of the role of human subjective activity in the ‘reality of the external world’
leads Gramsci to question the thesis of economic determinism, the conception of
the base and superstructure, and the common understanding of the aims and objects
of the ‘science’ of ‘historical materialism’ (hereafter HM). It is here that Gramsci
formulates his version of the problem of social ontology, which, as we will see,
concerns what we would now call the questions of ontological creativity, epistemo-
logical opacity, and coercion.
4.2. The reality of the external world: material basis and superstructure
Bukharin presents a specific thesis that only a strict materialism is compatible with
the ‘reality of the external world’. Gramsci’s account of social reality begins with
his attack on this thesis (Salice, 2009, p. 367). He charges that Bukharin’s discus-
sion is ‘badly framed and mostly pointless’ (2007, p. 364; Q8, §215),4 because it is
not the reality of the external world itself that needs to be analyzed by HM, but the
popular belief in this thesis. Gramsci provides such an analysis. He claims that this
common belief has a religious origin, regardless of the religious leanings of the
people who currently adopt it. He states:
Since people have believed for centuries that god created the world before he created
man and that man found the world already made and catalogued, defined once and
for all, this belief has become a ‘common sense’ fact, even in those cases where
religious feeling has been dulled. (2007, p. 365; Q8, §25)
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The interesting part of this claim for our purposes is that it explains one set of
common ‘everyday’ beliefs by another set of common religious beliefs, and not
with reference to the material bases of production. This indicates Gramsci’s desire
to break with the orthodox Marxist theses about the base and superstructure, which
he then makes explicit:
Idealist theories constitute the greatest effort at intellectual and moral reform that has
ever been made … This is related to the question of how and to what degree the con-
cept of superstructures of historical materialism is in fact a realization of idealism and
of its assertion that the reality of the world is a construction of the spirit. (2007,
p. 365; Q8, §215)
This quote reveals Gramsci’s motivation for developing a social ontology. He is
concerned with giving an account of the superstructures of society, namely
social institutions, and ultimately what we take to be social reality, in terms of
their construction by human subjectivity, and not purely in terms of their deter-
mination by the material bases of production. He states: ‘it is not the economic
structure that directly determines political action, but rather the interpretation
given to it and to the so-called laws that govern its development’ (cited
Fontana, 2006, p. 42). In other words, Gramsci takes the reality of the super-
structures to demand an explanation that includes the ontological creativity of
human intentionality.
The last note from this section introduces another important theme in Gramsci’s
writing, the relationship between HM and the natural sciences.5 Gramsci states,
‘The place of the natural or exact sciences within the framework of historical mate-
rialism. This is the most interesting and urgent question that needs to be resolved’
(2007, p. 365; Q8, §215). The reason this question has such meaning for Gramsci
is twofold. First, because the theories of natural science are theories, they are a type
of superstructure, and because HM is the science of superstructures, the theories of
natural science are objects of study for HM. Second, because HM understands itself
as a science, although with a particular object of study, its relationship and method-
ological differences to the natural sciences must be explained.
Gramsci and Bukharin agree that HM is a science; Bukharin’s mistake is to take
this science to be continuous with the physical sciences (Salamini, 1981, p. 31).
Gramsci states that:
To think that one can advance the progress of a work of scientific research by apply-
ing to it a standard method, chosen because it has given good results in another field
of research to which it was naturally suited, is a strange delusion which has little to
do with science. (1971, p. 439; Q11, §15)
For Gramsci, HM is its own science, with its own methods. Further, sciences can
be separated according to their objects of study, and HM corresponds to a particular
kind of object. Gramsci forcefully states his rejection of the metaphysical assump-
tions of the scientific Marxists as follows:
It is evident that, for the philosophy of praxis, ‘matter’ should be understood neither
in the meaning that it has acquired in the natural sciences … Matter as such [as devel-
oped by the natural sciences] is therefore not our concern [in the study of social phe-
nomena]. (cited Femia, 1981, p. 72)
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However, as we have not yet explained what ‘matter’ is for HM, it still seems as if
we have a paradox for HM. If the external world is objectively real and many of
the objects of study of HM are in the external world, how can the existence of its
objects of study be dependent on thought?
4.3. Historical materialism
This leads us to the question at the heart of Gramsci’s social ontology: what is
the nature of the objects of study for HM? To begin answering this question, let
us turn to the following quote: ‘What does “objective” mean? Does it not mean
“humanly objective” and therefore also humanly “subjective”?’ (2007, p. 337; Q8,
§177). Here, Gramsci is somewhat unclear about the senses of objective and sub-
jective he is employing. However, in another passage Gramsci states ‘man knows
objectively insofar as knowledge is real for all humankind historically unified in
a cultural unitary system’ (cited Salice, 2009, p. 368). In response to these two
quotes, I offer the following interpretation of Gramsci.6 In ‘humanly objective’,
‘objective’ is a synonym for ‘shared by the entirety of humanity’ and is therefore
a predicate that attaches to a proposition. If a proposition is ‘shared by humanity’,
it is epistemically objective. Think, for example, of the proposition that ‘Barack
Obama is the president of the United States’. The negation of this predicate for a
proposition that is not ‘shared by humanity’ is ‘epistemically subjective’. Think,
for example, of the proposition that ‘Chocolate ice cream is better than strawberry
ice cream’. In the second sense seen in ‘humanly subjective’, ‘objective’ is a
predicate that applies to an object. Things like mountains and rivers exist inde-
pendently of any subject, and can therefore be called ‘objective’ in this sense.
The negation of this predicate applies to objects that depend for their existence
on human intentionality, such as money, borders, and presidencies, and are there-
fore ‘humanly subjective’.
From this passage, however, it is not clear that this interpretation of Gramsci’s
claim about the meanings of objective and subjective matches Gramsci’s ideas.
Elsewhere, he states that ‘In vulgar materialist philosophy, the concept of “objec-
tive” appears to mean an objectivity that transcends man and can be known even
apart from man – this is just a banal form of mysticism and nebulous abstraction’
(2007, p. 338; Q8, §177). It appears here then Gramsci has gone too far in his
rejection of materialism, and has fallen into an equally vulgar form of idealism,
because this statement may lead us to the conclusion that nothing exists outside of
humankind. We can divide Gramsci’s thought here into two potential theses:
Thesis (1): If the entirety of humanity is convinced of the existence of an object X,
then X exists in the ontologically subjective sense.
Thesis (2): If the entirety of humanity is convinced of the existence of an object X,
then X exists in the ontologically objective sense.
In the following, I argue that (1) represents the foundation of Gramsci’s social
ontology. The epistemologically objective determines the ontologically subjective.
In other words, certain propositions that are ‘shared by humanity’ (epistemically
objective) bring entities into existence that are dependent on human intentionality
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(ontologically subjective). If, however, Gramsci is arguing for (2), his theory faces
several problems. Because (2) grounds the objective existence of certain entities in
human subjectivity it represents an untenable idealism. What is worse, it leaves
open the possibility that the objective existence of the entities studied by the natural
sciences is grounded in human subjectivity. Therefore, in order for Gramsci to have
a coherent theory of social objects, he must defend (1).
We can determine which thesis Gramsci has in mind by attempting to answer
the following two questions based on the two theses: (i) which objects exist only in
relation to human intentionality? That is, what is the domain of the ‘ontologically
subjective’? And (ii) do any objects that are not ontologically subjective exist for
Gramsci? That is, does Gramsci accept the category of ‘ontologically objective’?
In order to answer the first question, we may turn to a passage in which
Gramsci addresses an example of Bertrand Russell concerning the relation of East
and West (Salice, 2009, p. 368). Russell makes the following claim:
The part of the earth’s surface where Edinburgh stands would be North of the part
where London stands even if there were no human beings to know about North and
South and even if there were no minds at all in the universe. (1967, p. 56)
Russell is here attempting to defend the claim that predicates refer to universals that
have an ‘asubjective’ existence.
In his response to this example, Gramsci denies that East and West refer to
asubjective universals because the existence and structure of these entities is depen-
dent on human intentionality. He states that ‘East and West are arbitrary and con-
ventional, that is historical, constructions, since outside of real history every point
is East and West at the same time’ (1971, p. 447; Q11, §20). On the other hand,
Gramsci also holds that they are objectively real. He argues that East and West ‘do
not cease to be “objectively real” even though analysis shows them to be no more
than a conventional, that is “historico-cultural” construction’ (1971, p. 447;
Q11, §20). The reason that they remain ‘objectively real’ is that their existence is
accepted by a large and consistent group of people. Departing sharply from
Russell’s original concern, he points out that:
these terms have crystallised … from the point of view of the European cultured classes
who, as a result of their world-wide hegemony, have caused them to be accepted
everywhere. Japan is the Far East not only for Europe but also perhaps for the American
from California, and even for the Japanese himself, who through English political
culture, may then call Egypt the Near East. (1971, p. 447; Q11, §20)
Thus, we see that for Gramsci certain objects are created by the beliefs and inten-
tions of individuals or groups, and these objects are part of objective reality, giving
us our answer to Question (1): some objects, namely ‘historical-cultural construc-
tions’, are created by human intentionality and exist only in relation to it. Further,
Gramsci recognizes the causal importance of these designations, and the role that
they play in intentional action. He states that ‘These references are real; they corre-
spond to real facts, they allow one to travel by land and sea, to arrive where one
has decided to arrive’ (1971, pp. 447–448; Q11, §20).
It is important to note that for our purposes we do not need to accept Gramsci’s
rejection of universals or his specific rejection of East and West as universals
(Salice, 2009, p. 368). His antirealism with respect to universals is irrelevant to his
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thesis that East and West have historical origins, conventional importance, and cul-
turally dependent meanings, and therefore his thesis that they are social objects. If
he is right that East and West are not universals, his thesis is certainly stronger
because it means that they are fully social objects that exist purely on the basis of
human intentionality. If they are universals, he may still defend the weaker thesis
that there are universals that gain a new social dimension when they come into
contact with human intentionality. As we will see, Gramsci will defend the idea
that both are possible for different objects. In other words, some social objects are
generated from natural objects coming into contact with human intentionality, while
other social objects are created purely by human intentionality (Salice, 2009,
p. 368).
From this passage we can also see the beginnings of Gramsci’s most original
contribution to the study of social ontology. It is not actually on the basis of the
beliefs and intentions of the ‘entirety of humanity’ that East and West become
social objects, but rather on the hegemony of the ‘European cultured classes’. That
is, the dominant social classes are able to impose the existence of social objects as
a result of their position in a system of power relations. Further, these results are
widely applicable. It is not simply geographical relations, but all social relations
such as property, rights, and duties that have this structure.
For HM then, the objects of study are neither material in the sense of natural
sciences, nor in the sense of the material metaphysics of the ‘vulgar materialists’,
but rather are ‘historicized’ objects. Things become ‘historicized’ for Gramsci when
they come into contact with human intentionality (Salice, 2009, p. 368, Fontana,
2012, pp. 128–129). For example, when someone produces a machine, it has a par-
ticular material base which can be studied by the natural sciences, but it is also a
social object because it is dependent on human intentions for its creation, and
because it enters into social relations of property and economic production. This
second sense is the focus of HM. Even natural objects can become historical. For
example, electricity existed purely as a natural entity until it became a productive
entity in society, and entered into social relations. Only then did it become an
object of study for HM. Gramsci states:
Historical materialism takes the physical properties of matter into account, of course,
but only insofar as they become an ‘economic factor’ of production. The issue, then,
is not matter as such but how it is socially and historically organized for production,
as a human relation. (1996, p. 164; Q4, §25)
We now have an answer to the second question as well. Material entities such as
electricity exist independently of human intentionality, but HM does not need to
concern itself with them. As long as they have no role in human relations, it is the
wrong disciplinary task. HM deals with ‘historical objects’, or in other words, with
social objects. This is what gives it ‘scientific autonomy’ and characterizes its
relation to the natural sciences (1996, p. 165; Q4, §25).
4.4. Social objects
Let us now take a closer look at Gramsci’s account of these social objects. For
Gramsci, all social objects have a function, and this function is dependent upon ‘the
way of living, thinking and acting of the ruling class’ (2012, p. 126; Q14, §67).
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He recognizes that this implies that when ruling classes change, the social objects
that depend on them go out of existence. In order to avoid this consequence,
Gramsci discusses the ‘rationality’ of the function. He states that every social object
is rational insofar as it has a ‘useful function’, but this does not mean that social
objects ‘become “irrational” because the dominant social class has been stripped of
its power and its strength of influence’ (2012, p. 126; Q14, §67). While the functions
are dependent on the ruling classes for their creation, they may also be transformed
by succeeding cultures, and rationally developed to serve current interests. So, how
do we discover whether a given function is rational? We do so by investigating the
‘history’ of the object, relation, or practice. Only through the study of history can we
learn why a particular social object was created, what function it had, and whether it
is continuing to fulfill that function.
This means that Gramsci’s basic definition of a social object involves the appli-
cation of a function at a particular time and relative to a particular social group,
which includes both the ruling class and the ruled. This definition allows the func-
tion, and therefore, the nature of the social object, to change from one time to
another and from one group to another. It also allows the nature of the object to
remain the same over time and different groups, as long as it maintains the same
function, which in turn can be either rational or irrational at different points and for
different groups. Finally, there are both material and immaterial social entities.
Material entities are things like machines and electricity, while immaterial entities
are relations, rights, duties, and practices.
4.5. Background ideology
Gramsci also offers an original account of the types of mental attitudes on which
these functions depend (Fontana, 2006, p. 43). He does this in order to show how
social objects become ‘crystallized’ or how natural objects become ‘historicized’,7
and to show how they appear ‘natural’ or unchangeable when we encounter them.
As we saw, Gramsci holds that the functions of social objects depend on the inten-
tional attitudes of the ruling class. He argues that these attitudes can be collected
together into belief systems, which can display more or less coherence and con-
sciousness, where coherence refers to a lack of inconsistent beliefs and conscious-
ness refers to the awareness of a belief system that it is a particular belief system
that is shared by a social group. For example, common sense demonstrates the min-
imum of coherence and consciousness, while the natural sciences demonstrate the
most.
Belief systems can take an abstract or a historical form. A particular system is
abstract when it remains only the rational construct of a single individual. It is his-
torical when it is able to propagate itself, and gain acceptance from a wider group
of people. Only a belief system that is a system shared by a social group can create
social objects. Gramsci’s aim in his writings is for HM to take on this historical
form. The social group with the hegemonic position in society is able to apply their
belief system in order to determine the existence of social objects, and these social
objects, because they exert some control over us, are vital to our behavior. For
example, churches, prayer, and mass exist because the Christian religion became
‘historicized’. Just as important, the practices of praying and going to church on
Sunday equally depend on this historicization and the existence of the correspond-
ing social objects. To take another example closer to Gramsci’s main target,
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financial markets, stocks, bonds, and banks exist because the capitalist ideology
became ‘historicized’, just as practices such as investing, taking out a loan, and
starting a savings account do.
4.6. Power, hegemony, and civil society
This still leaves open two questions: what does it mean exactly for a belief system
to become historicized, and how does this happen? It is here that Gramsci intro-
duces his concept of hegemony, and his account of power relations in society.
Gramsci distinguishes between two forms of the supremacy of a social group can
take (Femia, 1981, p. 24): (1) leadership or consensus, and (2) rule or enforcement.
Roughly, this is meant to represent a distinction between ‘force’ for (2), which
manifests itself in the external rewards or punishments attached to specific behav-
iors, and ‘consent’8 for (1), which manifests itself in the ‘internal control’ brought
about by a society accepting a common understanding of social reality. Hegemony
is the supremacy attained by ‘consent’ rather than ‘force’ (Fontana, 2006,
pp. 27–29). Further, this distinction is meant roughly to correspond with the dis-
tinction between the state and civil society. In general, the state implements the
coercive machinery for the exercise of ‘force’, while civil society is the battle-
ground for ‘consent’. Hegemony is thus primarily obtained through the institutions
of civil society (Femia, 1981, p. 24).
These distinctions, however, are meant analytically and Gramsci does not claim
that hegemony is purely advanced in civil society (Fontana, 2006, pp. 32–33). In
order to better understand the process of ‘historicization’, we must analyze
Gramsci’s account of power relations to see how these elements interact. Gramsci
argues for a tripartite view of social power. The first part is economic power.
Stemming from the relations of production of society, social groups are differenti-
ated as a result of a convergence of interests. Then, because the products of society
are distributed unevenly across social groups, the groups that receive an inordinate
share of the social product are granted material power over the less-privileged to
further influence the relations of production. The second is political power, which
is dependent upon the consistency and coherence of the belief systems of the
groups formed by the relations of production. This is because groups that have
coherent belief systems, of which they are conscious, are better able to act in uni-
son to demand political power. This ability is also partly dependent on the degree
of economic power possessed by the group in question. The development of the
consciousness of these groups goes as follows: (a) the economic-primitive moment,
in which people bind together in order to realize a single economic goal; (b)
economic solidarity, in which the people in the groups realize that they have the
same economic goals and the social groups become solidary groups; (c) the politi-
cal moment, in which a social group recognizes that their own ideology can and
must be shared with other social groups in order to achieve their collective goals
(Salice, 2009, p. 368).
These power relations illuminate Gramsci’s distinction between domination and
leadership, in that they show how the adoption of a particular belief system func-
tions in a state. A social group can lead by ‘consensus’ on the basis of their social
hegemony without also being dominant in the military or police sense. Hegemony
may then be understood as a type of ‘voluntary submission’ by one group to
another as a result of their acceptance of the belief system of the leading group, in
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that the acceptance of a particular belief system by the non-hegemonic group is
often not recognized to be the result of imbalanced power relations and therefore
appears voluntary (Fontana, 2006, p. 31). Domination, in turn, is the enforcement
of certain rules through military or police violence. This leaves us with three poten-
tial power combinations: (1) A group X can lead (by consensus), but not be domi-
nant over a group Y; (2) A group X can be dominant, but not lead a group Y
(dictatorship); and (3) A group X can be dominant and lead a group Y (parliamen-
tary democracy).
Gramsci also gives an account of the process by which the acceptance of a
belief system takes place, which, as it is a question of hegemony, largely takes
place in civil society. Gramsci defines civil society according to the ideological
superstructure, namely all the institutions, organizations and associations that create
and diffuse modes of thought, such as journalists, schools, universities, and in our
times, lobby groups, think tanks, and so on (Fontana, 2006, pp. 35–37). This dis-
tinction is meant to allow for significant interrelation between civil society and the
state. The state, once it has achieved political power and is able to externally influ-
ence behavior through reward and punishment, also uses civil society to attempt to
attain social ‘consent’. Gramsci states that ‘the State, when it wants to initiate an
unpopular action or policy, creates in advance a suitable, or appropriate, public
opinion; that is, it organizes and centralizes certain elements of society’ (cited
Femia, 1981, p. 27). However, the central idea of Gramsci’s account is that the
struggle for hegemony itself happens in civil society, and this may occur before
political power is present, making it a major instrument for achieving political
power (Femia, 1981, p. 54). Thus, we can see that there is a dynamic relation
between civil society and political power. On the one hand, hegemony may arise
from pre-existing social institutions, while on the other, political power may exer-
cise itself in these institutions in order to further cement its hegemonic position.
4.7. Gramsci’s social ontology
For our purposes, we may draw the following conclusions about Gramsci’s social
ontology. Social objects depend on the belief systems of particular social groups at
particular times, and collective acceptance by a society. This acceptance is only
possible when the belief system of a social group becomes ‘historicized’, that is
when the belief system of a social group becomes accepted by a majority of people
in the society, and this often requires the social group to achieve a hegemonic posi-
tion in civil society. When all of these conditions are satisfied, the group is able to
influence the nature of social reality. The central insight of this approach is that
social reality is always based on power and interests. If we follow Gramsci and
take hegemony to be ‘the most important face of power’ (Femia, 1981, p. 31), this
account places power and coercion at the center, and develops a novel view of the
political dimension of social reality.
5. Answers to the three central questions
Gramsci’s political interests and position as a communist and revolutionary lead
him to develop a specific political strategy. In order to do this, he recognizes that
he needs an account of social reality and its construction. It does not, however, lead
him to analyze the logical structure of this construction or its specific instantiations.
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Because many of Gramsci’s claims are underspecified in this regard, they are com-
patible with several aspects of Searle’s account. Nonetheless, the first aim of this
section is to show that with some modification Gramsci provides an account which
answers the central questions of social ontology considered here. Additionally,
because Gramsci’s project has a specific normative goal, he introduces several
novel aspects to an analysis of social reality that are missing from Searle and much
of the modern debate, specifically a ‘genealogical perspective’ and a thorough
account of ‘background ideology’. The second aim of this section is then to show
how these aspects of Gramsci’s thought may influence an account of social ontol-
ogy, especially with regard to the role of power in social reality. When these two
accounts are combined, we have a comprehensive theory of social reality that
encompasses the construction of specific entities, the logical structure of these enti-
ties, their ideological nature, the genealogy of their functions, and the larger power
relations that condition their existence.
5.1. Metaphysical question
With respect to the metaphysical question, the main point of agreement between
Gramsci and the modern theorists is that social entities are dependent on human
intentionality. There is a strong similarity between the concern Searle expresses
about the ‘magical’ nature of social facts and the position put forward by Bukharin
and the other ‘vulgar materialists’, in that they both question the ‘reality’ of social
entities. Against this reduction to material foundations, both Searle and Gramsci
argue that certain social entities exist and have causal powers over and above their
material composition, and further, that this existence is dependent upon collective
acceptance and is relativized to particular contexts, which in Gramsci are further
specified to be particular groups and times.
Gramsci’s account focuses on the acceptance at the level of the set of beliefs or
ideology of a particular group with respect to social objects, while Searle focuses
on the acceptance of particular standing or ad hoc declarations as they relate to
social facts. There is nothing in Gramsci’s account that does not permit this type of
specific analysis.9 Because Gramsci’s account remains general, in that it focuses on
the belief systems of social groups rather than specific moments of implementation,
we are free to interpret the specific instances of the institution of a social object in
a variety of ways. We may then adopt Searle’s claims about the structure and
importance of declarations for specific social entities.10 By shifting the focus to the
belief systems that allow for these declarations, however, we may develop a more
nuanced account of how this acceptance comes about. There may be a standing
declaration to the effect that the person that receives the most votes in the electoral
college becomes president of the US, and this declaration is instantiated during the
swearing in, but in order to understand how and why these standing declarations
are present we need to understand the ‘background ideology’ of democracy that
has been accepted by a group. The acceptance of a particular belief system by a
social group is itself a social fact, as it depends upon some form of collective inten-
tionality. We should then expect a certain kind of dependence relation between par-
ticular social facts, as some instances of the application of a declaration depend on
pre-existing group beliefs. This is the type of analysis that Gramsci’s account
suggests, and it opens up the possibility of providing a critique of the ideological
foundations of social entities.
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Gramsci’s approach also offers us new potential for understanding the nature of
collective acceptance. While, as we saw, Searle allows for various degrees of
acceptance, he does not provide reasons for this differentiation. A framework for
explicating these degrees is built into Gramsci’s account. The stronger the pull of
the hegemonic ideology, the more robust the collective acceptance will be in speci-
fic cases. Further, in hierarchical societies the levels of acceptance of specific sub-
groups may be tied to the relevance of the accepted belief system for those groups.
The hegemonic subgroups in society may then be seen as the ‘operative members’
of the larger social group and display enthusiastic endorsement of a social entity,
while the less powerful groups are left to simply ‘go along with it’.11
The final area of broad agreement between Searle and Gramsci on the meta-
physical question is the importance of functions. Both argue that social entities are
defined by their functions. Here as well, Gramsci’s view can benefit from a specifi-
cation of functions in terms of status function, rather than simply agentive func-
tions. This is necessary because Gramsci employs the term function in several
ways, and generally means it in the sense of function for the ruling social groups.
By incorporating this distinction, and clarifying the difference between this general
sense of function, and the specific sense of status functions in terms of deontic
powers,12 we can more precisely delineate the different types of social entities.
Gramsci, on the other hand, suggests a method for the normative evaluation of
functions. His discussion of the ‘rationality’ of functions involves the study of the
history of a social object. He argues that we should take the ‘genealogical perspec-
tive’ in order to investigate the origins of a social object, the purpose it was meant
to serve, and its appropriateness in our current context. In this way then, we can
determine whether we should continue to collectively accept that object as a part of
our social reality. The upshot of this point is that we cannot understand status func-
tions simply in terms of the deontic powers that result from them; we must also
investigate their genealogy.
5.2. Epistemological question
With respect to the epistemological question, we also see substantial agreement, as
they both hold that while social entities are metaphysically subjective, they are also
epistemically objective. Thus both defend the objectivity of the domain of the
social sciences. This is not surprising as Searle states that his work will ‘deepen
our understanding of social phenomena generally and help our research in the
social sciences’ (2010, p. 5) and Gramsci takes himself to be carving out the
domain of a particular social science, namely HM.
The differences are best brought out by discussing a problem case for Searle.
As Thomasson (2003), and several others (Tuomela, 2003, 2013, Hindriks, 2011)
have pointed out, Searle does not discuss cases of derivative or unintended social
phenomena, such as recessions, in his earlier work. The important point about such
cases is that they seem to represent social or institutional facts that do not require
collective acceptance or recognition. They simply arise from other institutional facts
that have been accepted, such as money, markets, and contracts. Because Searle
argues that institutional facts necessarily come with their own deontology, and
thereby offers a restricted view of institutional facts, he denies that these are institu-
tional facts (2010, pp. 23, 116–119). These types of phenomena are often the sub-
ject of social-scientific inquiry, and so Searle is forced to admit that his account
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only applies to the ‘ground-floor’ institutional facts that carry deontological
implications.
Gramsci, however, is faced with the opposite problem. Because he argues that
all objects that enter into the social relations become objects of HM, he may be
charged with failing to differentiate between genuine institutional objects which
rely on intentionality and those that simply arise as a result of the ‘ground-floor’
institutional objects. Here Gramsci’s account could benefit by more precisely deter-
mining the bounds of ‘primary social entities’, such as corporations, laws, and con-
tracts, and ‘secondary social entities’, which are social in a derived sense, such as
statistical hiring and firing regularities.13
The novelty of Gramsci’s account on this issue again comes from his focus on
the historical nature of social objects, and the necessity of taking the ‘genealogical
perspective’ in order to conduct adequate analysis of them. One of the reasons that
we can discover new things about social objects for Gramsci is that they depend on
a historical development that may be initially opaque to us. We are normally con-
fronted with a pre-existing social object, rather than the direct constructors of it.
Gramsci’s emphasis on this point highlights that we need to explore the prima facie
unknown historical dimensions of social phenomena. This emphasis is seen, for
example, in Gramsci’s claim about the ‘rationality’ of the functions of social
objects, and it is pervasive in his account. One of the important connections here is
that it may often be the case that the ‘secondary social phenomena’ fall out of ‘irra-
tional’ social objects. Thus, unwanted and unintended social regularities, such as
recessions, may stem from social objects whose functions are no longer rational
given current social practices and attitudes. We can therefore discover new facts
about the functions of primary social entities by researching their history, and we
can connect these analyses to the unintended consequences that derive from the
current acceptance of primary entities.
5.3. Power and coercion in social reality
Both Gramsci and Searle argue that social reality is intimately connected to power
relations in a society, and attempt to provide some autonomy to social reality in
order to explain how we can experience our own intentional creations as foreign
and coercive. We experience social entities as coercive because they are fleshed out
in terms of what specific people are capable of doing in specific situations. The
police officer can pull the driver over because of the status attached to his position,
and for the driver this institutional fact may appear to be coercive.
It is with respect to the second part of the question of power, which concerns
the coercion that results from the unequal abilities of different social groups to cre-
ate social objects, that we see the benefits of a Gramscian analysis of social reality.
To see how these benefits arise, we may introduce a distinction developed by
Epstein (2014) between the ‘grounds’ and ‘anchors’ of social objects. Epstein
begins by considering a single institutional fact, F, and then asking, in virtue of
what is F the case? He then distinguishes between two kinds of explanations. In
his earlier discussion of money (1995, p. 28), Searle states that the constitutive
rule is:
(1) Bills issued by the Bureau of Engraving and Printing count as dollars in the
US.
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The first answer to our question is then present in the antecedent phrase. The
bill I am holding is a US dollar because it was issued by the Bureau of Engraving
and Printing. Epstein calls these types of explanations the ‘grounds’ of institutional
facts (2014, p. 76). But this explanation is incomplete. We must also ask, in virtue
of what is (1) the case? The answer to this is a fact of the following form:
(2) People in the US collectively accept (1)
Epstein then labels facts expressed by (2) the ‘anchors’ of S (2014, p. 81). The
basic idea is that there is a difference between (1) and (2), namely that (1) has the
job of giving the conditions an object must satisfy in order to be a dollar, while (2)
has the job of giving the facts that put those satisfaction conditions in place.
With this distinction in mind, we can clearly state the difference between
Searle’s and Gramsci’s accounts of power. Searle takes power to arise from (1),
which depends on (2), while Gramsci argues that the facts in virtue of which (2) is
the case depend on pre-existing power relations. In other words, instead of making
power relations dependent on the grounds of social entities, Gramsci argues that
the ‘anchors’ of social reality are power dependent. This does not entail that
Gramsci cannot accept that specific, explicit forms of power may arise from (1),
such as the capacity to purchase goods and services, but it does add a dimension to
his account of the coercive nature of social reality.
According to Gramsci, collective acceptance is a notion that is already imbued
with distinct and implicit relations of power between social groups. He attempts to
show that social entities depend upon belief systems, which in turn depend on facts
about the hegemonic positions of certain social groups. Only hegemonic groups are
able to ‘historicize’ their belief systems and put the background conditions required
for the application of specific declarations in place. For many individuals then, the
social reality they encounter appears coercive because it is based on belief systems
that run counter to their own, but have been accepted on the basis of the relative
positions of the group to which they belong.14 Thus, the creation of social objects
is itself coercive.
Several aspects of this position need to be clarified in relation to the modifica-
tions to Gramsci’s theory we have adopted. First, it may be argued that these power
relations are themselves social facts, and are simply based on more fundamental
applications of non-power-dependent grounds that have created specific institutions.
While it is true that these pre-existing power relations are social facts, they are not
necessarily institutional facts; social facts only require collective intentionality and
therefore may arise in pre-institutional systems, while institutional facts demand sta-
tus function declarations. For Gramsci, although the exercise of hegemonic power
often takes place within institutional structures, as these function to ‘historicize’ the
belief systems of the ruling social group, we may still hold that the formation and
belief system of the group depend simply on social facts.
Searle discusses a very specific type of power which relies on explicit institu-
tional authority. While it is certainly important to precisely capture this form of
power, there are also much broader forms of power in society. There is no reason
to limit our analysis of the creation of institutional reality to the power created by
institutional reality instead of the forms of pre-institutional power that create it. Fur-
ther, we may consistently argue that the primary social objects created by specific
declarations are dependent on pre-existing power relations. This comports well with
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the idea that derivative social facts, such as recessions, also depend on more basic
social facts about power relations and the acceptance of certain primary social
objects, without themselves being institutional facts.
The second concern comes from Searle’s conditions on ‘any reasonable discus-
sion of power’. On the surface, it appears that Gramsci’s account of power violates
both the ‘intentional’ condition and the ‘exactness’ condition. We may attempt to
mitigate this by arguing that we can specify groups, rather than individuals, that
exercise certain powers by getting other groups to adopt specific belief systems,
and that they do so intentionally. Even if we loosen this to include Searle’s notion
of background power, however, this does not seem like a plausible line. Any fur-
ther clarification of Gramsci’s claim would need to allow for the cases in which the
groups in question are loosely formed, and therefore not capable of acting
intentionally, or of being specified exactly.
The more promising response is to reject Searle’s conditions. While it may be
useful to distinguish between explicit and direct exercises of power and more dif-
fuse instances of ‘structural power’, there is no reason to restrict an analysis of
power to the first kind. First, it is not clear that Searle himself succeeds in doing
this. His claim that power can be exercised ‘unconsciously’ does not seem to be
consistent with the intentionality condition (2010, p. 158). Even if we can always
specify instances of background power, and therefore meet the exactness condition,
it appears that unconscious exercises of power are not intentional acts. Second, as
Hindriks argues, deontic powers may arise from unintentional acts. He asks us to
imagine a ‘president signing a document that she has not carefully read’ and points
out that ‘It seems that deontic consequences follow irrespective of the fact that the
act was unintentional with respect to them’ (2011, p. 384). Finally, it is not clear
that the idea of background power is useful as Searle construes it. He argues, for
example, that because of background power, he ‘cannot give a lecture wearing a
dress and high heels’, and this restriction results from the sanctions that would be
imposed upon him and his reluctance to accept those sanctions. If we ignore the
fact that some male-born professors can and do give lectures in high heels and
dresses, this analysis has a further problem. It simply accepts that these norms are
in place, and fails to recognize both that social norms are often uncodified, implicit,
and function below the level of linguistic and mental representation, and that the
acceptance of these norms is based on a certain set of implicit power relations
between groups of people. To ignore this issue is to fail to give an adequate
account of power in society.
6. Conclusion
Gramsci’s account of social reality benefits greatly from its place within his account
of political power, civil society, and hegemony. By incorporating these ideas into
his view of the creation of social objects, Gramsci is able to develop a nuanced
view of social reality that goes beyond the analysis provided by Searle with respect
to the relation between social reality and power. At the same time, Gramsci shares
with some modern accounts the idea that the material composition of social entities
does not fully capture all there is to be explained about them, which leads him to
the view that certain kinds of objects have properties on the basis of the collective
acceptance of those properties by social groups. This in turn leads him to address
three central issues of social ontology: ontological creativity, epistemic opacity and
244 M. Rachar
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [
T
he
 U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 o
f 
B
ri
tis
h 
C
ol
um
bi
a]
 a
t 0
1:
17
 2
5 
Ju
ne
 2
01
6 
coercion. On these issues, Gramsci’s account suffers from underspecification at the
level of the individual agent and the particular social object. We can rectify each of
these faults by combining the tools developed by modern theorists, such as declara-
tions, status functions, groups with operative and non-operative members, ‘grounds’
and ‘anchors’, and deontic power with Gramsci’s analysis of hegemony and
political power.
Gramsci’s specific contribution is his recognition that social power does not
simply arise from social reality, but goes into creating it. His account of hegemony
and civil society provides the framework with which we can analyze the difference
between the institutional power described by Searle and the wider sense of social
power upon which the generation of social reality relies. Gramsci insists that we
need to provide an ‘ideological critique’15 of the background belief system that
informs the nature of the collective acceptance of a specific social object, and that
we need the ‘genealogical perspective’ towards a social object in order to under-
stand its larger function and place in society. These elements represent a novel
addition to the modern debate and extend the analysis of social power to the differ-
ential ability of societal subgroups to construct the social world, which, in turn,
allows us to develop a more complete and powerful theory of social reality.
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Notes
1. This account of the aims of social ontology is greatly informed by the work of
Thomasson (2003, 2009), as well as Searle (1995, 2010), Tuomela (2003, 2013), and
Frank Hindriks (2011). Given the connections aimed at in this paper, it should also be
noted that the term ‘social ontology’ was brought into the modern lexicon in the
context of an analysis of Marxist thought by Gould (1978).
2. This section embraces an interpretation developed by Alessandro Salice in a seminar
on Gramsci at the University of Vienna in 2012 and sketched in Salice (2009).
3. The title of Bukharin’s original text in English is Historical Materialism: A System of
Sociology. Gramsci, however, refers to it as ‘Il Saggio Populare’ (‘The Popular Man-
ual’). I follow him in that usage. For further discussion of this issue see J.A. Buttigeig,
‘Notes’ in A. Gramsci (1991, p. 520).
4. The second part of the reference is to the original section in Gramsci’s notebooks.
5. For further discussion of this point see Fontana (2012).
6. The following distinctions are worked out by Searle (2010, p. 18).
7. For a discussion of the difficulty of defining ‘historical’ in Gramsci, and the relation of
‘historical’ to ‘social’, ‘conventional’, and ‘artificial’, especially with respect to the
relation between ‘social object’ and ‘historical object’, see Salice (2009).
8. Gramsci’s use of consent here is idiosyncratic. It is meant as a description of the psy-
chological state of the subjects of rule, denoting some kind of acceptance. It is not
meant to carry with it the normative connotations that it traditionally does, say, for
example, in social contract theory (Femia, 1981, p. 37–43).
9. There is some tension between those who wish to analyze social reality in terms of
social objects and those who wish to analyze social reality in terms of social facts
(Thomasson, 2003, 2009, Epstein, 2014, Searle, 2014). It appears that Gramsci, who
discusses social objects, and Searle, who discusses social facts, may be in disagreement
on this issue. However, as Gramsci is not working with the same distinctions, language
or conceptual background we can remain neutral on the issue here.
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10. We of course do not have to accept some of Searle’s more controversial claims about
the primacy of language in social reality. For a critique of these claims see Hindriks
(2011).
11. An account of hierarchical groups is given by Tuomela (2013).
12. This is not to suggest that a Gramscian analysis should take on board the contentious
claim that all status functions necessarily come with deontic powers (Tuomela, 2013,
p. 240).
13. For a detailed account along these lines see Tuomela (2013, p. 223).
14. This picture is somewhat simplified for the sake of analysis. Belief systems are not
formed and do not exist in isolation; they are often constituted relationally and depend
on more than simple group membership. Nonetheless, simplifying from these compli-
cations gives us a clearer idea of how this process functions in general.
15. The question of how to engage in this type of critique has not been dealt with in this
paper. Nonetheless, further exploration of Gramsci may prove useful in developing
such a method, as much of his work concerns practical issues of this nature, rather
than the more theoretical issues dealt with here. This can be seen in Gramsci’s
influence on cultural studies.
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